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UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE FRANKFURT PARLIAMENT
THE CASE FOR THE GUTTMAN SCALE
Donald J . Mattheisen(+)
Abstract : Though the unidimensional Guttman scale is a
relatively primitive statistical technique compared with
multidimensional methods such as factor analysis, it does
have its uses
. Its simplicity is a virtue, for its meaning
can be easily understood
. It is merely a way of pointing
out who voted which way on a series of questions, given
the existence of a scalar voting pattern
. My example is
roll-call voting in the Frankfurt Parliament, which exhi-
bits a remarkably large left-right ideological scale.
Since many of the scalar votes deal clearly with signifi-
cant constitutional questions I have been able to dis-
tinguish 8 fairly distinct ideological positions and to
classify each ranked deputy accordingly
. Comparing these
scale score categories with party membership uncovers the
ideological standpoints of the parties as well
. There is
of course still plenty of room for more sophisticated
analysis of the Frankfurt Parliament's roll-call voting,
especially since this study uses only part of the data.
One of the projects of the Center for Historical Social Research - the
sponsor of this journal - is the collection and analysis of roll-call votes
in German parliaments
. In a recent article Heinrich Best published some of
his observations on that subject, giving special attention to the Frankfurt
Parliament of 1848/49, for which the Center has a large set of machine-
readable roll-calls
. He observed among other things that, as in most legis-
latures, the voting patterns in the Frankfurt Parliament are multidimen-
sional ; and he argued that a satisfactory analysis requires a multidimen-
sional statistical method such as factor analysis rather than the unidimen-
sional Guttman scaling, which "is becoming unfashionable in roll-call analy-
sis" precisely for that reason
.(1) Best's observation is perfectly correct,
and his argument for a multidimensional method of scaling is unexception-
able
. Yet it can happen that a relatively primitive method like Guttman
scaling has advantages that justify its application even when a more sophis-
ticated method is available
. I certainly do not want to deprecate factor
analysis, which Best has already employed to good effect
. But I would like
to point out here that Guttman scaling has a unique quality that makes itjust as useful.
That quality is, in a word, comprehensibility
. Guttman scaling is extremely
simple in concept, and the meaning of a Guttman scale score is easy even for
the statistical illiterate to grasp
. The technique merely gives quantitative
expression to a particular pattern of consistent voting
. The consistent
pattern exists when a legislature divides on a given set of votes in such a
way that it has only yes voters, no voters, and voters who consistently say
yes on some votes and no on the others - but not vice versa .(2)
(+) Address all communications to: Donald J
. Mattheisen, Department of
History, Lowell University, Lowell, Mass. 01854, USA
.
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The clearest and simplest illustration would involve matters of fact . Ima-
gine a legislature responding to these two questions : Are you over 5 feet
tall? Are you over 6 feet tall? The shortest legislators would answer no-no,
those of medium height would answer yes-no, and the tallest would respond
with yes-yes. But nobody would answer no-yes because one is not, in fact,
both short and tall . Thus the consistent voting pattern would reflect the
fact that there are short, medium and tall legislators . They would sort
themselves into those three categories with their votes . Those categories
could be identified by Guttman scale scores given on the basis of the number
of the respondents' yes votes : the shortest would get O's, the middle-sized
i's, and the tallest 2's. The significance of each score is obvious. A
somewhat more realistic example involving matters of opinion would be the
two questions : Shall we raise taxes by at least 10%? Shall we raise taxes at
least by r00%? The three likely responses would again be no-no, yes-no, and
yes-yes ; it is unlikely that any of the respondents would object to a 10%
tax increase but not to a 100% increase . Of course in matters of opinion
anything is possible, and the apparently inconsistent responses might pos-
sibly be forthcoming. In that case the prerequisite pattern of consistent
answers would be lacking, and no Guttman scales could be constructed . But
the chances are that our legislators would sort themselves into the 3 groups
of stand-patters, modest tax-raisers, and big spenders - scale scores of0,1
and 2 respectively, based on their yes votes . Here too the meaning of a
scale score is plain. To be sure, there are some tricky technical aspects to
Guttman scaling when you start working with it in practice . But my point is
that it is very simple in principle . You could explain it to any member of
your history department.
Not so with factor analysis . Here we enter the sterile world of mathematics,
where the subject matter is not yeas and nays but correlation matrices and
the several types of variance . With scientific rigor and sophistication the
method searches out the sources of statistical variance and reduces them to
a limited number of "factors" around which one can group the mathematically
related roll-call votes . Legislators can be given "factor scores" to rank
them on each factor . The result is analogous to Guttman scaling : a factor
takes the place of a scale, and factor scores substitute for Guttman scale
scores . And in fact when both methods are employed on the same data the
results are usually similar - as they should be, since both methods are
supposed to uncover and to measure relationships that are already embedded
in the roll-call record. But what a difference when it comes to explaining
the nature of these relationships in concrete terms! We have seen how simple
and clear is the Guttman scale relationship . But it is virtually impossible
to emerge from the austere realm of factor analysis into the everyday world
of concrete imagery . What is the meaning of a factor score? To answer that
question one plunges backward into the equations, not forward into the arena
of legislative activity . And the answer, once obtained, remains abstract and
mathematical - useful in some ways, but not in others . Such an answer is
particularly hard to communicate to other members of the history department
in the ordinary language that we all possess in common.
Since legislative voting behavior is usually multidimensional, as Best
pointed out, factor analysis is clearly the appropriate method to use in
obtaining a complete description of it . But one is not always looking for a
complete description . Let us return to the Frankfurt Parliament . Best ran 52
of its roll-calls through a factor analysis program . He found that over half
of them (27 roll-calls) had high loading on a single factor . which upon
examination he concluded represented a "right-left dimension" . Of the re-
mainder, 10 represent a "particularist versus unitarian" dimension . Some
other roll-calls seem to have had high loading on single factors . Best
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concluded from this experiment, quite correctly, that the voting here was
multidimensional, presumably showing that it was not all determined by party
loyalty ; thus further study of its determinants could be rewarding, since it
might reveal forces hitherto concealed.(3) Interesting as this discovery of
multidimensionality is, however, it is not the only striking feature to
emerge from his analysis
. Consider the unusually high proportion of roll-
calls that fit the large right-left dimension : obviously, Frankfurt's depu-
ties handled many of their problems in general ideological terms, especially
if they didn't involve the issue of particularism versus unitarianism
. Given
the fact that the ideological views of these men have long been a matter of
interest, this ideological dimension alone deserves some attention . The
question is, can it help us to understand better the ideological positions
of the various factions? If so, it is useful . To be sure, the answer to this
question would leave many others unanswered and multidimensional analysis
might address them more successfully . But the first question is fascinating
enough to be taken up all by itself.
The large factor tells us that a series of these roll-call votes called .
forth ideological responses . It might be instructive to spread these votes
out along the left-right spectrum to see just where the ideological clea-
vages lay, and then to sort out the deputies into their ideological catego-
ries . Can factor analysis help us here? We have seen that the interpretation
of factor scores is not an easy matter
. But if we created a giant Guttman
scale with these roll-calls so that high scale scores fall on the left and
low scores on the right, it would tell us this : That the highest scorers
voted left on all those questions, the lowest scorers voted right on them
all, and those in between voted left on some and right on the others, their
exact scale score showing precisely which is which . In short, it would
provide us with something like a huge questionnaire showing exactly where
each deputy stood on a big range of issues
. If, compared with factor analy-
sis, the method is lacking something in sophistication, it makes up for
that deficiency in helping us to address an old and interesting question:
what did Frankfurt's parliamentary factions really stand for?
Let me give some answers to that question from my own work
. Of the Frankfurt
Parliament's 297 roll-call votes I examined the 225 that seemed to have some
substantive meaning - votes that were not procedural or too difficult to
interpret . The conventional criterion of scalability between any 2 votes is
the statistic Yule's Q, an index that reaches a value of 1 .o when they are
perfectly scalable - if there are no non-scale responses at all. It is not
customary to demand perfection in these matters, but to be satisfied with an
approximately scalar pattern yielding a Q of .8 or
.9 for each comparison.
The search uncovered a scalar pattern similar to what Best found with factor
analysis : at the .9 level of Q a large right-left scale of 95 votes, a
smaller particularist-unitary scale (mostly of grossdeutsch-kleindeutsch
questions) of 32 votes, and a tiny scale of 4 votes having to do with Polish
matters
. I am concerned here only with the large right-left scale, which I
expanded to 128 roll-calls by lowering the minimum value for Q to
.8 in or-
der to bring in as many of these ideologically related votes as possible.
This is the raw material for the Guttman scale.
But the raw material is almost overwhelming
. For one thing, all 128 ques-
tions are not of equal importance
. Some deal with trivialities, others are
crucially significant
. In this paper I use only a few roll-calls that seem
most enlightening
. For another thing, they do not automatically separate the
deputies into well-defined blocs
. Divisions are sparse at the extremes
(indicating few lop-sided votes), but they tend to bunch up toward the
middle, with marginals (defined here as "left" votes) occuring at every
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point along the scale between .30 and .6o. I have chosen only 7 significant
roll-calls and constrcuted the Guttman scale with them, using the other
scalable votes mainly to corroborate the importance of those points. That
avoids the technical difficulties of actually building a Guttman scale from
massive numbers of votes.
Table I shows the roll-calls used, which I identify (here and elsewhere)
with the letter V (for vote) followed by the page number in the stenographic
record - for example, V5192 is the roll-call vote that begins on page 5192
of Wigard's Stenographischer Bericht .(4) They make a scale of 8 positions,
ranging from o for the most conservative to 7 for the most radical . I have
given each scale position a descriptive label, which I will discuss below.
The frequency column shows the proportion of deputies with each score . The
scale was created by SPSS, which gave it a coefficient of reproducibility of
.943 and a coefficient of scalability of .832 .(5)
TABLE I ,
Scale Marginal Frequency Roll Call Vote
	
"Left"  Ideological
Score
	
in
	
vote
	
Label
0 13
1 .87 13
2 .74 14
3 .60 8
4 .52 7
5 .45 13
6 .32 6
7 .26 26
Conservatives
V5192 : State parliaments yes
	
Moderate
to be given the right to
	
conservatives
initiate legislation.
V5346 : The franchise to
	
no
	
Moderates
require a high property
qualification.
V4120: Suspensive veto yes
	
Liberal
for ordinary legislation
	
monarchists
V3910 : The nobility to
	
yes
	
Democratic
be abolished "as a
	
monarchists
class".
V6045 : The states may
	
no
	
Latent
change their form of go-
	
republicans
vernment only through the
amendment procedure.
V593 : The head of the
	
yes
	
Probable
Provisional Government
	
republicans
to have the title of
President.
V4800 : Any German is
	
yes
	
Ardent
eligible to be elected
	
republicans
head of state.
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I will discuss the scale with reference not only to the 7 selected votes but
also to the other scalable roll-calls that could have been included and that
help to amplify it . The 3 most rightward positions, scale scores 0-2, belong
together as varieties of a conservative standpoint. Men with those scores,
40% of the assembly altogether, voted against just about all of the reform
proposals considered - scale score o literally against all of them, scale
score i against all but i, and scale score 2 against most of them . Their
common viewpoint seems to have been what in r848 was usually called konsti-
tutionell : they wanted for Germany a constitutional order that would
resemble that of the pre-March constitutional states, where a powerful monarch
dominated a largely consultative parliament with few real legal or political
controls over his actions .(6) There are some differences among them . The
most conservative (scale score o) rejected a proposal to give to the state
parliaments in the new federal German Empire the right to initiate legisla-
tion, a measure passed by 87% of the assembly . Even when one considers the
hazards of interpreting a negative vote this is not a progressive position;
"conservative" is not too strong a label . Those with scale scorer voted in
favor of that measure, but they sided with the conservatives in all other
matters, including a high property qualification for the right to vote . They
are thus a little more moderate in their conservatism - "Moderate Conserva-
tives" . Finally, those with scales score 2 sided with the o's and the is on
all but those two items. That is, they are "Moderates" because they favored
giving legislative initiative to the state parliaments and also a lower
property qualification for the franchise . But in all other matters in this
scale they were at one with their colleagues on the right.
There are several roll-calls around the .60 level that help to define the
common position of this conservative bloc more clearly . One is on the ques-
tion of the veto for the German Emperor, which was a particularly sensitive
question. The famous Professor Dahlmann argued passionately for an absolute
veto on national security grounds, but it lost by a narrow margin (V4100,
with a marginal - proportion of the vote that is "left" - of .56) . After
much rancorous debate the Parliament then adopted a mild form of suspensive
veto, one that gave the Emperor ample opportunity to try to reverse it if he
wished (V4100, .60).(7) Even then he would retain an absolute veto over
constitutional amendments, a provision confirmed a little later by a signi-
ficant majority (V4994,
.43) . But the Konstitutionelle (that is, scale
scores o-2) held out to the end for an absolute veto in all cases.
The constitution granted the federal government special powers for use in
emergencies - to suspend constitutional guarantees concerning arrest, search
and public assembly under conditions of war or upheaval (see paragraph 197).
While the Parliament's majority granted these powers to the federal execu-
tive on condition that the suspensions last no more than 14 days before the
Reichstag be summoned for its approval, the conservative bloc would have
permitted the government to decide when, or even whether, to secure the
approval of the Reichstag (V5021, .58) ; and it sought to add freedom of the
press to the list of suspendable rights (V 3975, .59) The issue here is
whether there ought to be some political control over the Emperor's consti-
tutional emergency powers . To some degree it presents a choice between
monarchial and representative government, and the conservatives - here as
elsewhere in the voting record - tended strongly to favor the monarch when
faced with that choice.
The Parliament passed a surprisingly democratic electoral law for the Volks-
haus, the lower chamber of the projected Reichstag . It enfranchised most
males 25 years of age and older, and it included direct elections, the
secret ballot, and equal electoral districts . As one might expect, the
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conservatives voted against it ( V 5556 , .57). In particular, they went on
rcord as objecting to direct elections (V5535, .57) and favoring a property
qualification ( V 5349, .55). They also objected to a provision of the law
forbidding the government to refuse civil servants a leave of absence for
the purpose of accepting election to the Volkshaus (V5408, .57). Many German
governments had long tried to protect conservative parliamentary majorieties
by such tricks. The Frankfurt conservatives evidently wished them to retain
that option in the future.
Also instructive here is a vote on what became the second sentence of
paragraph 147 of the constitution : No religious association enjoys special
privileges from the state ; no state church exists ." The conservative
deputies voted against it (V4129, .56), opposing one of the most distinctive
propositions of 19th-century liberalism . Similarly, they opoosed abolishing
capital punishment (V3943, .6o).
TABLE 11
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Table II shows that the party grouping generally followed the ideological
scale (R=
.916), even if some parties in the center were unusually tolerant.
It also shows that the conservative-Konstitutionelle bloc of scale scores 0-
2 is largely identical with the Milani and Casino parties, together with the
right wings of the Landsberg and Württemberger Hof and excluding a handful of
Casino members on the party's left. That is interesting in view of the fact
that the Casino is usually regarded as a centrist party, as distinct from
the avowedly conservative Milani . Here the two parties appear to cohabit in
the same generally conservative region, at least with respect to these
scalable issues
. Many of the most prominent Casino members have the most
conservative voting records : Bassermann, Beckerath, George Beseler,
Dahlmann, Detmold, Droysen and Jürgens all have scores of o, while Duncker,
Haym, Hergenhahn, Langerfeld, Lette, Mathy, Raumer and Waitz have scores of
. (Unfortunately some top leaders of the party like Gagern and Simson could
not be given scale scores because they voted infrequently ; they were too
busy being ministers or Parlamentsprdsidenten)
.(8) This somewhat unexpected
result tends to confirm two recent reinterpretations of the Frankfurt Par-
liament
. Werner Boldt and Wolfram Siemann, from different perspectives and
using different sorts of evidence, both conclude that the so-called "mode-
rate liberals" at Frankfurt, principally Casino members, have been misnamed.
In fact, says Boldt, they called themselves conservatives rather than li-
berals
. They supported authoritarian political and constitutional measures.
If they did temporarily practice parliamentary government at Frankfurt it
was only because they had a majority there and that was the best way to shut
out the influence of the left
. According to Siemann their language was full
of notions borrowed from the very conservative historical school of law,
which had influenced many of them
. He calls their viewpoint "historical-
organological constitutional-monarchical conservatism"
.(9) Thus both authors
maintain that the "moderates" were really conservatives
. The voting records
do indeed make it appear so.
Opposing this conservative bloc, and providing the necessary edge for ma-
jorities sufficient to make the Frankfurt constitution a liberal document,
were the men of the center - scale scores 3 and 4
. I have labelled them
"Liberal Monarchists" and "Democratic Monarchists" since unlike the repub-
licans to their left they did not question monarchy as such, but they do
represent different degrees of fairly progressive reformism within the
nominally monarchical fold . All but a few of them were on the left side of
all the divisions we have so far discussed : the suspensive veto, the aboli-
tion of capital punishment, the electoral democratic law, the role for
parliament in constitutional emergencies, and the abolition of the state
church
. But the Democratic Monarchists (4's) distinguished themselves from
the Liberal Monarchists (3's) in several ways, perhaps most clearly by pro-
viding the margin of victory for the sensational vote that abolished the
aristocracy "as a class", which ended up as Paragraph 137 of the constitu-
tion . (V3910,
.52) . This was a measure first introduced four months earlier
in bolder language, which was twice defeated in that form (V1340,
.37 and
V3901, .44), but finally secured the necessary majority after the inclusion
of the phrase "as a class"
. Nobody could properly explain what that meant,
but it was intended to soften the attack on Germany's most powerful special
interest group
. It signified that even at the cost of dangerously provoking
that interest group the majority was willing to give concrete expression to
the ideal of civic equality
. The vote was generally interpreted as a bold
step in that direction.
In other ways, too, this dividing line was significant
. Approximately the
same majority voted to antagonize the aristocracy even further by abolishing
entail, a practice by which a noble estate owner could settle his property
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on its future heirs so that creditors could not secure its partition (V4290,
.53 ; see Paragraph 170 of the constitution) . They also adopted the language
of Paragraph 144 : No one is obliged to reveal his religious convictions"
(V3981, .5z), taking a considerable step toward complete religious freedom.
And they determined that being convicted of a political crime (such as lese
majeste) would not exclude one from eligibility for election to the Volks-
haus (V5401, .52), important because many of the pre-March opposition had
been imprisoned at one time or another for crimes of that sort . Such people
might otherwise have been barred from full participation in the politics of
the new German state.
These centrists were evidently not very conscious of their ideological
affinity, since they scattered themselves among 5 of the Parliament's 8
parties (see Table 11) . They tended either to be "back-benchers" on the left
wing of the Casino and Landsberg - Dröge, Teichert and Zöllner are the men
with scores of 4 in the Casino, while the Landsbergers with that score are
Buttel, Dammers, Grüel, Krafft, Lang, Lüntzel and Quintus - or else members
of the Augsburger or Württemberger Hof, some of whom were leaders : Bieder-
mann, Fallati, and Riesser of the former and Mittermaier of the latter are
good examples. Neither conservatives nor republicans, they were scorned by
both extremes . Gustav Rümelin grumped that they were the German Gironde,
only much smaller in numbers, talent, and prospects . . ." .(10) But Rümelin
was wrong to deprecate their significance, since it was they - by definition
- who gave to the constitution its moderate liberal character by blocking or
modifying the more extreme proposals from either side . The literature on the
German revolution tends to concentrate on the ideas and actions of right or
left, since that is where the most prominent men took their places . It might
be worthwhile to consider whether these relatively obscure centrists, second-
rate wafflers though they may be, should not be regarded as authentic fore-
runners of the German liberal movement. Their very obscurity is suggestive.
The left side of the chamber was more diverse than the right side, since
there are many more roll-calls dividing it up . But in spite of their diver-
gences on concrete issues the deputies with scale scores 5, 6 and 7 shared a
fundamental commitment to popular sovereignty, the classic touchstone of the
European left for the past 200 years.(11) They manifested this value in
several ways, most significantly in the roll-calls touching on the question
of the republican form of government . They were not all "Ardent Republi-
cans", to be sure ; as the poet-deputy Heinrich Laube observed, "there was a
great difference between the republican-minded and the outright republicans,
and there was among the republicans themselves again the widest range of
ideas about the immediate form of a German republic ."(12) But they did all
take a positive view of republicanism, and that separates them in an impor-
tant way from the men of the center and right . In addition, their eager
reformism on a number of other points marks them off quite plainly as a
left-wing bloc parallel to that on the right.
The roll-call I have chosen to signify the borderline of the left may seem
odd : it is a vote on Paragraph 195, which forbids a change in the form of
any state government without the consent of the central government, such
consent to follow the rule prescribed for amending the German constitution
(V6045,
.45) . ( 1 3) But this strange provision started out in the constitutio-
nal committee as an adaptation of Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution
of the United States, which guarantees to the states a "republican form of
government" : certain committee members wanted to reverse that for Germany
and guarantee to her states a monarchical form of government .(14) By the
time it came before the assembly the language had been altered, but the
intention remained the same : to require any state seeking to change itself
- 27 -
from a monarchy to a republic to secure the approval of the federal
government, under a procedure that guarantees the Emperor - a monarch himself - an
absolute veto
. No better legal guarantee short of an absolute prohibition
could be devised
. One can reasonably infer that the 45% opposing this
measure did not want to erect a perpetual dam against such a change, and thus
were not unequivocally committed to defending monarchy
. This inference is
considerably bolstered when we look at a vote taken a short time earlier on
a proposal by the left wing of the constitutional committee that the
following statement be adopted as a prologue to the section on The Central
Government" : "The German people is sovereign
. All central governmental power
is derived from the people" (V5966,
.42) . It was supported by nearly the
same group of deputies
. While not directly addressing the monarchical form
of government this assertion of popular soverignty has within it the essence
of republicanism
. Its proponents were, at very least, "Latent Republicans".
As one might expect, the left also came forth with a number of proposals to
move the country in a democratic direction . They supported the merely sus-
pensive veto for constitutional amendments, in a form identical to that for
ordinary legislation (V4994,
.43) . They voted for the unqualified abolition
of the aristocracy (V3901, .44) . In a bid to separate civil society entirely
from the church they went beyond guaranteeing religious liberty to
establishing the liberty to abstain from joining any sort of religious
organization" (V3983, .47), and to providing that "The public schools may
not be confessional" (V4161, .45) . They supported local autonomy against the
traditionally omnicompetent German state by requiring all communities to
creat an "organized armed force as part of a general militia (Volkswehr)"
(V5618,
.44) and by eliminating the usual requirement that elected local
officials be confirmed by the state (V5615,
.43) . There is no doubt that the
Frankfurt Constitution would have been a far different document, immeasurab-
ly more democratic, if this leftist bloc had had its way . And it came within
a few points of success, amounting as it did to about 45% of the chamber.
But it would not have declared the republic . Only a fraction of its member-
ship was overtly republican . Exactly what fraction is not entirely clear.
That is because although the Parliament voted on the question, it did so in
two different instances with slightly differing results . One instance con-
cerned the Provisional Government installed in June, 1848, which was to
"govern" until the Parliament had time to draft a constitution . Some 32% on
the left wanted the head of the Provisional Government to have the republi-
can-sounding title of President . That was defeated (V593, .32), and in its
place was established a Reichsverweser - "Vicar of the Empire" - who by
prearrangement was to be a Habsburg Archduke
. To emphasize the monarchical
character of this temporary office an amendment added that the Reichsverwe-
ser would be " non-responsible", presumably in the same sense as a constitu-
tional monarch
. That amendment was opposed by the same 32% on the left
(V606, .32) . Apparently each side, republican and monarchist, was trying to
prejudice the eventual outcome in the constitution by creating a precedent
to its own liking
. The monarchists won in both instances, but in January,
1849, the die-hard republicans made a last attempt by proposing a popularly
elected head of the German state, an office for which "any German is eligib-
le" (V4800, .26) . The 26% voting for that proposal are republicans without a
doubt.
Then how about the men who were republicans in the first instance but not in
the second? Had they changed their minds? Perhaps, but there is also the
fact that many deputies treated the Provisional Government as a different
kind of institution from the constitutional one
. For example, the Parliament
voted by a large majority (74%) to require the Reichsverweser to secure its
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assent on declaring war, concluding peace, and making treaties with foreign
powers (V587, not a scale vote)
. Yet a substantial majority rejected impo-
sing the same requirement on the German Emperor vis a vis the Reichstag
(V4882,
.33) . They had not changed their minds on the principle ; they were
merely conscious of dealing with two different types of regime . The Frank-
furt Parliament had responsibility for guiding the nation to successful
unification, and it could not credibly delegate that responsibility to a
Provisional Government . But -an established Emperor was a different matter,
and the majority, at least, sought to give him most of the powers tradition-
ally held by German monarchs, including sole responsibility for foreign and
military affairs, uncomplicated by parliamentary meddling .(15)
This differential treatment of the Provisional and the constitutional go-
vernment makes it hard to generalize from votes having to do only with the
former . It is clear from the record, though, that the left was divided into
at least two strata, and that the leftmost of its members were "Ardent
Republicans" . Though there are few other divisions to give us more insight
into their intentions, one roll-call suggests that the 26% on the left had
an agenda somewhat different from the others . Though nearly all the measures
considered by the Parliament were of a political or constitutional rather
than a social nature, some members of the left tried to propose such things
as a progressive income tax and state help for the unemployed . The assembly
voted by a big majority not to consider those matters, over the objection of
the republicans on the left (V5143, .26).
The "Latent" and "Probable Republicans" had an affinity for the
Württemberger Hof - for example, von Hermann and von Wydenbrugk - though several other
center parties had their share of them : for instance, Wurm of the Augsburger
Hof and Moritz Mohl and von Reden of the Westendhall . The Deutscher Hof and
Donnersberg were the republican parties par excellence ; nearly all of the
famous radicals, belonged to one of them and earned a scale score of 7:
Ludwig Simon, Vogt, and Wesendonk, to name just a few.
One might suppose that the sorting-out of deputies into ideological blocs
that I have done in this paper could have been accomplished just as well
with other sources. But the scholarly debate involving Boldt and Siemann
that I cited early in this paper shows the need for empirically documenting
the deputies' positions on the issues. Roll-call votes, though they only
deal with some of the issues, are a useful way of doing that. Roll-calls are
frequently used uncritically by historians, as when 2 or 3 votes are selec-
ted to measure support for rival viewpoints. Every reader of this journal
will of course be conscious of the need for a prior statistical examination
of the roll-calls to be certain that they are in fact comparable . But it is
not always appropriate to use the most powerful statistical tool available
for that sort of thing . The choice of method ought to depend on what you are
looking for . Factor analysis is a splendid device for an exhaustive study of
the patterns of roll-call voting . But if you are trying to determine who
voted for or against particular measures, then Guttman scaling seems to me
to be the proper tool . I am not sure that factor analysis could do the same
job.
- 29 -
FOOTNOTES
1 Heinrich Best, "Recruitment, Careers and Legislative Behavior of German
Parliamentarians 1848-1953", in : Historical Social Research/Historische
Sozialforschung, No . 23 (July 1982), p. 4.
2 Guttman scaling is explained in Lee F . Anderson et al ., Legislative Roll-
Call Analysis, Evanston, 1966, pp . 89-121, and Duncan MacRae, Jr ., Issues
and Parties in Legislative Voting, New York, 1970, pp . II-38. I have
adapted my explanatory examples from the latter . The same two works
discuss factor analysis as well.
3 Best, pp . 2 3- 25 .
4 Franz Wigard, ed ., Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der
deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main,
9 vols ., Leipzig 1848-49.
5 See Norman Nie et al ., SPSS : Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,
2nd ed
., New York, 1975, Chapter 26.
6 See inter alla Ernst-Wolfgang Boeckenfoerde, "Der deutsche Typ der kon-
stitutionellen Monarchie im 19
. Jahrhundert", in : Werner Conze, ed .,
Beiträge zur deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19 . Jahr-
hundert, Stuttgart 1967.
7 See Paragraph 101 of the constitution : A Reichstag measure turned down
by the Emperor could not be passed again in the same session ; only if it
were repeatedly enacted in each of the next three regular Reichstag
sessions would it become law over the Emperor's veto . An election would
intervene, so the new Reichstag would have to be included in the process.
As Gülich pointed out in the discussion in the constitutitonal committee,
this came close to an absolute veto de facto: Rudolph Huebner, ed.,
Aktenstücke und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Frankfurter National-
versammlung aus dem Nachlaß von Johann Gustav Droysen (Stuttgart 1924),
p. 535. The roll-call I used is V4120, the vote on first reading. The
majority improved substantially on second reading (V6030) . But that
second roll-call is not a scale vote . lt does not fit the simple
right-left division pattern because the enhanced majority came about through
the famous Simon-Gagern Pact, by which some conservative champions of the
absolute veto switched sides on the issue in order to induce some left-
wing opponents of the hereditary Emperor to reciprocate on that question.
8 By inventing an ingenious system for handling missing values Heinrich
Best and Reiner Kuznia, "Die Behandlung fehlender Werte bei der seriellen
Analyse namentlicher Abstimmungen : Oder : Wege zur Therapie des Horror
Vacui", in : Historical Social Research/istorische Sozialforschung, No.
26 (April 1983), pp . 49-82, have been able to assign factor scores to
nearly all the Frankfurt deputies on the analogous factor, no matter how
few votes they cast
. Since their system does not seem to be adaptable to
Guttman scaling I must concede that important advantage to factor analy-
sis.
9 Werner Boldt, Die Anfänge des deutschen Parteiwesens, Paderborn 1971, and
"Konstitutionelle Monarchie oder Parlamentarische Demokratie : Die Aus-
einandersetzung um die deutsche Nationalversammlung in der Revolution von
1848", in : Historische Zeitschrift Vol . 216 (June 1973), pp
. 553-622;
Wolfram Siemann, Die Frankfurter Nationalversammlung 1848/49 zwischen
demokratischem Liberalismus und konservativer Reform, Bern 1976, and
"Parteibildung 1848/49 als 'Kampf ums Recht' : Zum Problem von 'Liberalis-
mus' und 'Konservatismus' in der Paulskirche", in : Der Staat, Vol . 18
(1979), pp.199-227.
10 Gustav Rümelin, Aus der Paulskirche . Berichte an den Schwäbischen Merkur
aus den Jahren 1848 und 1849, Stuttgart 1892, p. 122.
11 See David Caute, The Left in Europe Since 1789, London 1966.
12 Heinrich Laube, Das erste deutsche Parlament, Leipzig 1909, I, p
. 45 .
- 30 -
13 It is actually a vote on the second part of Paragraph 195, the part
specifying the procedure. V6045 is the vote on second reading ; it passed
first reading by a similar margin (V497 8 , .44) .
14 See the discussion in Huebner, Aktenstücke, pp. 356-365.
15 See inter alia the statements by Dahlmann and Wurm in Wigard, Stenogra-
phischer Bericht, p . 524, pp . 4878-4880 . The proposal to give the Frank-
furt Parliament a decisive role in these matters originated with the
conservatives on the constitutional committee, not with the democrats:
ibid ., p. 35 8 .
